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THE CALVO AND DRAGO DOCTRINES
Among the subjects scheduled for discussion at the third Pan-Amer-
ican conference, which met at Rio de Janeiro during July and August,
1906, was a resolution that the second peace conference at the Hague
be requested to
consider whether and, if at all, to what extent, the use of force for the
collection of public debts is admissible.
There seems to have been some objection to the resolution in this form
on the ground that such action
would arouse the distrust of European capitalists and thus affect
unfavorably the credit of Central and South American countries.,
But a resolution was finally agreed upon on August 22, and unani-
mously adopted, which provided that the conference recommend to the
governments represented that they
consider the advisability of inviting the second peace conference at the
Hague to examine the question of the compulsory collection of public
debts, and, in general, the best means tending to diminish among nations
conflicts of purely pecuniary origin.2
It will be seen that the resolution in its final form, while in nowise
binding upon the governments represented at the conference, recom-
mends a consideration not only of the narrower Drago Doctrine,
which merely forbids the forcible collection of public debts, but that
it points to the broader Calvo Doctrine3 which absolutely condemns
diplomatic as well as armed intervention4 as legitimate methods of
1 L. S. Rowe in the Independent for October 5,1906. Dr. Rowe adds: "This feeling
was strengthened by the fact that, prior to the meeting of the conference, the Euro-
pean press had exploited to the utmost the dangers incident to the enunciation of
any such doctrine."
I From President Roosevelt's recent message to Congress of December 4, 1906.
3 Of course there is no express or implied endorsement of the Calvo Doctrine
contained in the above resolution. But in view of political and economic conditions
and the teachings of publicists coupled with those of. experience, there can be little
question as to the state of public opinion on this subject in Latin America.
ICalvo does not distinguish between armed and diplomatic or pacific intervention
except as a matter of form. He condemns the latter as well as the former. See Le
Droit International (5th ed.), i, §110, p. 267.
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enforcing any or all private claims of a purely pecuniary nature, at
least such as are based upon contract or are the result of civil war,
insurrection or mob violence.
In his discussion of the important and complicated subject of inter-
vention in the first volume of Le Droit International,5 Calvo claims
that European nations have followed a different rule or principle of
intervention in their dealings with American states from that which
has governed their relations with each other. He points out that
during the greater part of the nineteenth century at least, intervention
in Europe always rested upon some important principle of internal
politics, such as the balance of power, or upon some great moral or
religious interest favorable to the development of civilization; while
in the new world the interventions of European states have rested
upon no legitimate principles, being based upon mere force and a failure
to recognize the complete freedom and independence of American
states. This, he explains, is due to the traditions of the colonial sys-
tem.
Aside from political motives these interventions have nearly always
had as apparent pretexts, injuries to private interests, claims and demands
for pecuniary indemnities in behalf of subjects or even foreigners, the
protection of whom was for the most part in nowise justified in strict
law. * * * According to strict international right, the recovery of debts
and the pursuit of private claims does not justify de plano the armed
intervention of 'governments, and, since European states invariably
follow this rule in their reciprocal relations, there is no reason why they
should not also impose it upon themselves in their relations with nations
in the new world.6
In that portion of his work' entitled Mutual Duties of States 7 Calvo
denies categorically that a government is responsible for any losses or
injuries sustained by foreigners in time of internal troubles or civil
war.
To admit in such cases the responsibility of governments, i. e., the prin-
ciple of indemnity, would be to create an exorbitant and fatal privilege
essentially favorable to powerful states and injurious to weaker nations,
and to establish an unjustifiable inequality between nationals and
foreigners.
T. i, liv, iii. See especially §§185-206.
6Op. cit., §205, pp. 350-351.
.7 T. iii, liv, -xv.
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In sanctioning such a doctrine one would, he says, be guilty of a deep,
although indirect, attack upon one of the fundamental elements of
the independence of nations, viz: that of territorial jurisdiction. He
adds:
Herein lies, in effect, the real significance of this frequent recourse [on
the part of European governments] to the diplomatic channel for
settling disputes which by their nature and surrounding circumstances
belong to the exclusive domain of the ordinary courts.8
After citing a number of opinions of statesmen and examples drawn
from the general practice of nations,9 Calvo restates his doctrine and
presents the following conclusions:
1 The principle of indemnity and diplomatic intervention in behalf of
foreigners for injuries suffered in cases of civil war has not been admitted
by any nation of Europe and America.
2 The governments of powerful nations which exercise or impose this
pretended right against states, relatively weak, commit an abuse of power
and force which nothing can justify and which is as contrary to their own
legislation as to international practice and political expediency.0
In his discussion of the Aigues Mortes affair in the sixth volume of
his work,-, Calvo also denies that a government, "in the absence of all
fault on its part," is legally liable for injuries to foreigners which result
from mob violence on the grounds that a state is not responsible for
acts of mere individuals and that aliens can not claim a more extended
protection than is granted to its nationals.
On December 29, 1902, Sefior Luis M. Drago, minister of foreign
affairs for the Argentine Republic, sent a note to Sefior M6rou, the
Argentine minister at Washington, which attracted widespread atten-
tion in Europe as well as in the United States. In this note, which
8Op. cit., §1280, p. 142. A few pages above (§1278, p. 140), Calvo speaks of the
frequent attempts to impose upon American states the rule that "foreigners merit
more consideration, and regards and privileges more marked and extended, than
those accorded even to the nationals of the country where they reside." Elsewhere
(t. vi, §256, p. 231), he observes: "It is certain that foreigners who establish them-
selves in a country have the same protection as nationals, but they can not lay claim
to a protection more extended. If they suffer any wrong they ought to expect the
government of the country to pursue the delinquents, but they should not claim
from the state to which the authors of the violence belong any indemnity whatever."
0 Ibid., §§1281-1296.
10Ibid., §1297, pp. 155-156.
" T. vi, liv, xv, §256; cf. t. iii, §1271.
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was called forth by the attempt then being made by the allied powers
(Great Britain, Germany and Italy) to collect certain claims agdinst
Venezuela by forcible means, Sefior Drago stated at the outset that
he would leave out of account those claims arising from damages suf-
fered by subjects of the claimant nations during revolutions and wars
but would confine himself to
some considerations with reference to the forcible collection of the public
debt suggested by the events that have taken place.
In respect to loans to a foreign state, he argued that the lending capi-
talist always takes'into account the resources of the country, the kind
or degree of credit and security offered, and makes his terms more or
less onerous accordingly. He knows that he is dealing with a sover-
eignty, and
it is an inherent qualification of all sovereignty that no proceedings for
the execution of a judgment may be instituted or carried out against it.
This argument he based upon the theory of the freedom anid indepen-
dence of states which lies at the basis of the modem system of inter-
national law.
In support of this contention, Sefior Drago quotes Alexander Hamil-
ton, who said:
Contracts between a nation and private individuals are obligatory
according to the conscience of the sovereign and may not be the object of
compelling force. They confer no right of action contrary to the sover-
eign will.
He also cites the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, which provides that
the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of
any foreign state.
Sefior Drago admitted that the payment of its public debt (the
amount of which may be determined by tribunals of the country or
by arbitration) is absolutely binding on the nation; but he maintained
that it (the nation) has a %
right to choose the manner and the time of payment, in which it has as
much interest as the creditor himself, or more, since its credit and its
national honor are involved therein.
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He explains that
this is in nowise a defense for bad faith, disorder, and deliberate and
voluntary insolvency. It is merely intended to preserve the dignity of
the public international entity which may not thus be dragged into war
with detriment to those high ends which determine the existence and
liberty of nations.
Declaring that the Argentine people were alarmed lest the action
of the allied powers in Venezuela "would establish a precedent dangerous
to the security and peace of the nations of this part of America" (for
"the collection of loans by military means implies territorial occu-
pation to make them effective, and territorial occupation signifies the
suppression or subordination of the governments of the countries on
which it is imposed;" a "situation" which "seems obviously at vari-
ance with the Monroe Doctrine"), and pointing to the danger lest
European nations make use of "financial intervention" as a pretext
for conquest, this far-sighted Argentine statesman suggests that the
United States adopt or recognize the principle
that the public debt [of an American state] can not occasion armed
intervention, nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American
nations by a European power.1
In his message of December 5, 1905, President Roosevelt pronounced
himself with his wonted vigor in favor of the Drago Doctrine. After
calling the attention of Congress to the embarrassment that might be
caused to our government by the assertion by foreign nations of the
"For the text of the Drago Note, See House Doe. of 58th Congress, 2d session
(1903-04), pp. 1-5.
In a memorandum sent to Sefior M~rou in reply to this communication, Secretary
Hay discreetly expressed neither assent to nor dissent from the propositions set forth
by Seflor Drago, but he quoted two passages from recent messages by President
Roosevelt to indicate the general position of the government of the United States:
"The President declared in his message to Congress of December 3, 1901, that by
the Monroe Doctrine we do not guarantee any state against punishment if it mis-
conducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition
of territory by any non-American state;" and "in harmony with the foregoing
language, the President announced in his message of December 2, 1902: 'No indepen-
dent nation in America need have the slightest fear of aggression from the United
States. It behooves each one to maintain order within its own borders and to dis-
charge its just obligations to foreigners. When this is done they can rest assured
that, be they strong or weak, they have nothing to dreadfrom outside interference.' "
Secretary Hay closed this communication with a declaration in favor of arbitration
in such cases.
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right to collect by force of arms contract debts due by American
republics to citizens of the collecting nation, and to the danger that
the process of compulsory collection might result in the permanent
occupation of territory, he said:
Our own government has always refused to enforce such contractual
obligations on behalf of its citizen by an appeal to arms. It is much to
be wished that all foreign governments would take the same view.
A comparison between the views of Calvo and Drago as above
expressed will show that they differ in two very important respects.
The Drago Doctrine is much narrower in scope than that of Calvo.
Sefior Drago merely denounces armed intervention as a legitimate or
lawful means of collecting public debts, whereas Calvo denies the right
to employ force in the pursuit of all private claims of a pecuniary
nature. Indeed, Calvo advances a step beyond this position. He
absolutely denies that a government is responsible by way of indem-
nity for any losses or injuries sustained by foreigners in time of internal
troubles, civil war, or for injuries resulting from mob violence (pro-
vided the government is not at fault) on the grounds that the admis-
sion of such a principle of responsibility would "establish an unjusti-
fiable inequality between nationals and foreigners" and would under-
mine the independence of weaker states. He does not even admit
that the ordinary channels of diplomacy are open to claimants in such
cases.
In general, private claims of a pecuniary nature against Latin Ameri-
can states may be classified as follows: 1, Claims arising from acts
of violence or oppression, such as cruel treatment, false imprisonment
expulsion or mob violence; 2, those based on losses sustained during
civil war or insurrection; 3, those based upon contract, consisting for
the most part of claims of bondholders and investors whose invest-
ments have been guaranteed by the defaulting government.3
11 So, e.g., the claims of Great Britain and Germany against Venezuela in 1902-03
were divided into three categories: 1, Those based upon the false imprisonment
and bad treatment of British subjects and the seizure of British vessels; 2, losses of
British and German subjects sustained during recent civil wars and revolutions; and
3, the claims of creditors, including not only ordinarybondholders but also a number
of Britons and Germans whose investments had been guaranteed by the Venezue-
lan government. Also see an article by the writer, entitled The Venezuelan Affair
in the Light of International Law in the American Law Register (May, 1903), vol.
42, n. s., pp. 250 ff.
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The liability of a government for acts of violence and oppression
must depend upon the circumstances of each case. A state is of course
directly responsible14 for acts of its agents and must bear the full con-
sequences of any violation of the laws of nations committed by these.
Such acts should be promptly disavowed and, if of sufficient impor-
tance, their authors punished and reparation made. 15
In ordinary times a state is also indirectly responsible for the orderly
conduct of all those residing or domiciled within its territory and sub-
ject to its jurisdiction, and is bound, not indeed to prevent all acts
of violence against foreigners, but to furnish the same degree and
kind of protection and, generally speaking, provide the same means
of redress or measure of justice that is granted to its own na-
tionals. 16
In attempting to secure redress or justice, foreigners must in the
first instance have recourse to the local or territorial tribunals of the
district in which they are domiciled, or, as Vattel17 puts it, to the
"judge of the place." Judicial remedies should, as a rule, be exhausted
before resorting to diplomatic interposition for means of obtaining
redress. 8 But this rule does not apply in case of a gross or palpable
denial of justice, where local remedies are wanting or insufficient, where
judicial action is waived, where the act complained of is in itself in
violation of international law, or where there is undue discrimination
against foreigners on the part of the authorities. 9
14 This responsibilityis to states rather than to indviduals. The individual, as such,
has neither rights nor duties in international law other than those belonging to him as
a citizen or subject to an international entity. On the theory of International
Responsibility of States for Injuries Suffered by Foreigners, see two recent articles
by l. Anzilotti in the Revue Gdn~rale de Droit International Public for 1906, pp. 5-29
and 285-309.
15 This does not apply to the judicial functionaries who are more or less independent
of the executive in all modem well-regulated states. "All therefoee that can be
expected of a government in the case of wrongs inflicted by the courts is that compensa-
tion shall be made, and if the wrong has been caused by an imperfection in the law of
such kind as to prevent a foreigner from getting equal justice with a native of the
country, that a recurrence of the wrong shall be presented by legislation." (Hall,
Treatise (3d ed.) §65, p. 214.)
16 This is the general rule, but it is not, as we shall see, wholly without exception.
17 Bk. II, ch. 8., §103; cf. Bk. II, ch. 6, §§ 72 and 73.
18 Moore, Digest of International Law, vi, §987. Wharton, ii, §241.
19 For examples of such exceptions, see Mloore, §§913-914, 986-993, 1021, and
Wharton, §§230 and 242.
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It
does not apply to countries of imperfect civilization, or to cases in
which prior proceedings show gross perversion of justice.20
The question of the liability of a state for injuries to the persons
or property of foreigners resulting from mob violence is one in which
the people and government of the United States as well as those of
Latin America, should be deeply interested. Whether due to the inten-
sity of feeling engendered by race and labor problems or to a lax enforce-
ment of the law resulting from cumbrous and antiquated legal methods,
the American custom of lynching for certain crimes and under certain
conditions shows little sign of abatement and is not likely to disappear
until the causes which lead to it are removed.
The rule which has generally been verbally maintained by American
statesmen seems first to have been laid down by Daniel Webster in
connection with the riots at New Orleans, and Key West in 1851, which
resulted from the summary execution of a number of American fili-
busters in Cuba. While admitting that the Spanish consul (whose
office had been attacked and furniture destroyed) 2' was entitled to
indemnity, Mr. Webster maintained that those Spanish subjects who
had been injured in person or property (there seems to have been no
one killed) were not entitled to compensation, inasmuch as "many
American citizens suffered equal losses from the same cause," and
foreigners are merely
entitled to such protection as is afforded to our own citizens. * * * These
private individuals, subjects of Her Catholic Majesty, coming voluntarily
to reside in the United States, have certainly no cause of complaint, if
they are protected by the sanie law and the same administration of
law, as native born citizens of this country."
As a mark of courtesy and out of respect to the magnanimity of the
queen of Spain (in liberating American prisoners), Congress neverthe-
less granted compensation to Spanish subjects as well as to the Spanish
consul for losses sustained during these riots.
History has repeated itself in the case of a number of claims made
by foreigners for injuries resulting from mob violence in the United
10oMr. Evarts, Secretary of State, to Mr. Marsh. Wharton's Digest, ii, p. 695.
21 The archives of the consulate had also been thrown into the street, the portrait
of the queen of Spain defaced, and the Spanish flag torn to pieces.
"Wharton's Digest, ii. §226, p. 601; cf. Moore, vi, §1023, pp. 812-813.
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States from that day to this. In the majority of these cases, the United
States government has refused to admit liability in principle, but has
granted compensation as a matter of grace and favor, or from a sense
of magnanimity, sympathy, benevolence or policy.23 Some of our
statesmen, however, admit liability in case of a failure on the part of
the local authorities or courts to use due, i. e., reasonable, diligence
in preventing or punishing such crimes, and this is unquestionably
a rule of international law. 24
On the other hand, the United States has shown commendable zeal
in protecting its citizens from such attacks abroad. It has repeatedly
interposed diplomatically in China, Turkey, Mexico, Panama, Chili,
Brazil and other Central and South American States.2
In view of this double inconsistency-that of theory and practice
on the one hand, and that of our attitude at home and abroad on the
other-would it not be wise for our government frankly to admit
liability in all cases of attack by mobs upon foreigners as such or upon
those of a particular nationality wherever and whenever the local
authorities show themselves unwilling or unable to prevent, and the
courts unable or unwilling to punish such crimes? Foreigners cannot
be expected to appreciate the merits (?) of our present "peculiar"
national institution of lynching, and foreign states have an undoubted
right to demand a better protection for their nationals against this
species of violence than is afforded them -by our own local authorities
and courts in some parts of this country.
" This was notably so in the cases of the 43 Chinese killed and wounded at Rock
Springs, Wyoming in 1885 and of the Italians lynched at New Orleans, in 1891.
For these and numerous other cases, see Moore's Digest, vi, §1026.
This rule is usually stated in language ascribed to Secretary Evarts: "A govern-
ment is liable internationally for damages done to alien residents by a mob which by
due diligence it could have repressed." See Wharton's Digest, ii, p. 602. But the
absence of quotation marks in Wharton and a reference to Evarts' dispatch in Moore's
Digest (see vol. vi, pp. 817-818) shows that Mr. Evarts did not use the language
ascribed to him. It is, however, a good statement of an undoubted principle of inter-
national law if we add the words "and which it fails to punish." The fact that our
Federal government has sometimes been unable to secure justice for foreigners by
reason of constitutional or statutory limitations does not affect its international
responsibility.
IMoore, op. cit. For the diplomatic activity of the United States in China, see
the extremely able communication of the Chinese minister, Cheng Tsao Ju, to Secre-
tary Bayard, on pp. 822-826.
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But it may be urged that the admission of such a rule or principle
might, in some cases, give to foreigners a protection superior to that
enjoyed by its own citizens. This may be true in countries where life
and property is insecure from mob violence, but civilized states are
supposed to grant at least a fair or average amount of such protection
in ordinary times, and it is no adequate reply to a charge of denial
of justice8 to, or an undue discrimination against, foreigners to say
that nationals frequently suffer similar injustice. It would of course
be different in the case of an ordinary miscarriage of justice, where the
spirit as well as the forms of the law had been complied with, or in the
case of one accidentally killed or injured in the course of a riot or insur-
rection .27
In view of the recent protest by Japan against the segregation of
Japanese school children in California and the surprising ignorance of
the principles governing the rights and privileges of foreigners dis-
played in some quarters, it seems necessary to point out that a state
is under no international obligation to extend to foreigners the enjoy-
ment of civil and private rights or to place them upon an equal footing
with its own nationals in these respects. Whatever rights or privi-
leges of this kind foreigners may enjoy, whether of an educational,
economic or religious nature, are based on convention or the principle
of reciprocity, or are granted as a matter of pure grace and favor.28
All that an alien, who is permitted to set foot or reside on foreign
territory (and this permission is purely optional) can demand as a
matter of strict right in international law is protection of life and prop-
erty together with access to the local courts for that purpose.
The same principles may, in general, be said to apply to cases of
injuries or losses sustained by foreigners during civil war and insurrec-
tion, except that the law of necessity or the physical inability to furnish
adequate protection generally absolves governments from responsi-
bility in such cases. The general rule is that
a sovereign is not ordinarily responsible to alien residents for injuries
they receive on his territory from belligerent action, or from insurgents
whom he could not control.
20 On what constitutes a denial of justice, see especially, Moore vi, §986; Wharton,
ii, §230; and Anzilotti, op. cit., pp. 21-23.
27 See, e.g., the case of Bain in loore, op. cit., §1027.
28 See especially on this head, the recent article by Anzilotti in the R. D. I. P.,
cited above, pp. 18-20.
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They are
not entitled to greater privileges or immunities than the other inhabi-
tants of the insurrectionary district. * * * By voluntarily remaining in a
country in a state of civil war theymust be held to have been willing to
accept the risks as well as the advantages of that domicile.9
These principles have been repeatedly enunciated by our leading
statesmen,30 as well as by those of Europe,31 and they have the al-
most unanimous sanction of leading authorities on international law."
They have invariably been applied by European states in their relations
with each other, although frequently violated in their dealings with
weaker states, more particularly in the cases of China, Turkey and
the republics of Latin America.
There are, however, several exceptions which must be made to these
general principles. Indemnity would seem to be due to foreigners
by way of exception in the following cases: 1. Where the act com-
plained of is directed against foreigners as such, or as subject to the
jurisdiction of some particular state. 2. Where the injury results
from an act contrary to the laws or treaties of the country in which
the act was committed, and for which no redress -can otherwise be
obtained. 3. When there has been a serious violation of international
law, more particularly of the rules of civilized warfare. 4. In cases
of evident denial of a palpable violation of justice, or undue discrim-
ination against foreigners on the part of the authorities."
"Wharton's Digest, iii, §223. Secretary Seward to Count Wydenbruck in 1865.
See Moore's Digest, vi, pp. 885-886. cf. Wharton, pp. 577-578.
30 For numerous opinions of American statesmen, see Moore's Digest, vi, §§1032-
1049. cf. Wharton, iii, §§223-226.
3" See especially the notes of Prince Schwartzenburg (Austrian) and Count Nessel-
rode (Russian) in reply to certain claims of the British government which were based
upon injuries to British subjects during the revolutions in Tuscany and Naples in
1848. Cited by Pradier-Fod~r6, i, §205, pp. 343-345 and Moore, op. cit., pp. 886-887.
82 See, e. g., Calvo, iii, §§1280 ff ; Pradier-Foddr6, Trait6, i, §§202 ff., 402 if., iii,
§§1363 ff.; Fiore, Droit Int. Pub. (Antoine's trans.), i, §675; Wharton, iii, §223;
Hall, Treatise (3d ed.), §65, pp. 218-219; Bluntschli, §380 bis; Funck-Brentano et
Sorel, Precis, ch. 12, pp. 227-229; Taylor, §216; Oppenheim, i, p. 213; Bonfils
(Fauchille), §§326 if.; Liszt, §24, pp. 189-190; Pillet, Les Lois de la Gueire, p. 29;
Weisse, Le Droit International appliqu6 aux Guerres Civiles, §14; Bar in R. D. I. for
1899, t. xxix, pp. 464-482. See Brusa in Annuaire for 1898, t. xvii, pp. 96-138 for
arguments in favor of responsibility.
3See especially the rules adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1900.
Annuaire, xviii, pp. 254-256. cf. Moore's Digest, op. cit., Pradier-Fodr6, iii, §1366,
p. 237; Bar and Brusa, cited above.
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In respect to the third class of claims, viz: those based upon contract,
including for the most part those of bondholders and investors whose
investments have been guaranteed by the defaulting government, the
few authorities who discuss this question appear to be divided in their
opinions, with a majority opposed to forcible collection. The right of
a state to use coercive measures in the collection of debts of this nature
is asserted, e. g., by Hall, Phillimore, and Rivier; but it is denied by
Calvo, Pradier-Fod~r6, Rolin-Jaequemyns, F. de Martens, Despagnet,
Kebedgy, and Nys. 4
It is argued, on the one hand, that the public faith, the so-called
"honor of the prince," is particularly engaged in the case of contracts
of this nature, inasmuch as a government cannot be sued without its
own consent; that creditors may have no other means of redress than
that of appealing to the government of the state to which they owe
allegiance; that stock in the public debt held even by an enemy is
exempt from seizure and its interest payable even in time of war; and
that states, being in legal theory free and independent and having no
common superior to control or check them in any way, each state has
therefore the legal right of deciding for itself when its rights have been
invaded and of determining the conditions under which it may use
force for any purpose whatsoever.n
On the other hand, it is urged that hazardous loans and investments
should be discouraged as much as possible; that those making them
' Hall, §86, pp. 277-279; Phillimore, ii, pt. v, ch. 3, pp. 26-30; Rivier, i, liv, iv,
ch. 2, §20, pp. 272-273; Calvo, i, §205, p. 350; Pradier-Fod&r4, i, §405, pp. 620-623;
Rolin-Jaequemyns in R. D. I., t. i (1869), pp. 145 ff.; F. de Martens in R. D. I., t.
xix, p. 386 and in a recent pamphlet, entitled Par la Justice vers la Paix; Despagnet,
Cours. §258; Iebedgyin R. D. I. P., t. i,p. 261, and Nys, ii, p. 225.
On April 17,1903, the publicist Calvo, then representing the Argentine Republic at
Paris, addressed a circular letter to a number of leading authorities on international
law, asking for their views on the question raised by the Drago note. Of the ten
opinions published in the Revue de Droit International (see R.D.I. for 1903, pp. 597-
623), six (those of Passy, Mloynier, Campos, F6rand-Giraud, Weiss and Olivecrona)
were in substantial agreement with the principals of the Drago note. Four (those of
Westlake, Holland, Charmes and Fiore) were more reserved. While apparently
not in absolute disagreement with the principles of the Drago note, they held
either that it needed qualification or that the question was undecided. For a
brief analysis of these opinions, see Percy Bardwell in the Green Bag for July,
1906, pp. 378-379.
3 Such is, e. g., the argument of G. W. Scott in the North American Review for
October 5, 1906, pp. 603-604.
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do so, as a rule, with a full knowledge of the risks incurred and in the
hope of exceptionally large returns; that the natural penalty of a failure
on the part of a state to fulfill its obligations is a loss of credit; that
foreigners cannot expect to be preferred to native creditors; that coer-
cive measures for the collection of bad debts are never employed
except against weaker states and are likely to be used as a pretext for
aggression or conquest; and that
it is an inherent qualification of all sovereignty that no proceedings for
the execution of a judgment may be instituted or carried out against it.36
The views of British and American statesmen are not in complete
harmony on this important subject, although the general policy of
Great Britain and the United States has been substantially the same.37
The English view, as stated by Lord Palmerston, in 1848, in a cir-
cular addressed to representatives of Great Britain in foreign countries,
insists that the question as to whether such claims are to be made a
subject of diplomatic negotiation is
for the British government entirely a question of discretion, and by no
means a question of international right.
With a view, however, of discouraging the investment of British cap-
ital in hazardous loans to foreign governments and of encouraging
investment in profitable undertakings at home,
the British government has hitherto thought it the best policy to abstain
from taking up as international questions the complaints made by
British subjects against foreign governments which have failed to make
good their engagements in regard to such pecuniary transactions.
But he intimates that such loss might become so great as to make a
change of policy on the part of the British government advisable.
These views of Lord Palmerston were reaffirmed by Lord Salisbury
in January, 1882, and by Premier Balfour in December, 1902. s
11 Seftor Drago in note, cited above.
"Except for the British intervention in Mexico, Egypt and Venezuela. But in
all these cases those representing the government of Great Britain denied that they
intervened primarily for the sake of the bondholders.
8For the text of this circular, see Hall, note on pp. 278-279 (3d ed.), and Phillinore
ii, t. v, ch. 3, pp. 27-28. In 1861, Lord John Russell, in a communication to Sir C.
I. Wyke, stated that "it has not been the custom of Her Majesty's government,
although they have always held themselves free to do so, to interfere authoritatively
on behalf of those who have chosen to lend their money to foreign governments."
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The policy of the United States9 in dealing with claims based on
contracts was thus stated by Secretary Fish in 1871:
Our long-settled policy and practice has been to decline the formal
intervention of the government except in cases of wrong and injury to"
person and property such as the common law denominates torts and
regards as inflicted by force, and not the result of voluntary engage-
ments or contracts.
In cases founded upon contract, the practice of this government is to
confine itself to allowing its minister to exert his friendly good offices in
commending the claim to the equitable consideration of the debtor
without committing his own government to any ulterior proceedings. 40
In 1881, Secretary Blaine laid it down as "a rule of universal accept-
ance and practice" that a person
voluntarily entering into a contract with the government of a foreign
country or with the subjects or citizens of such foreign powers, for any
grievance he may have or losses he may suffer resulting from such con-
tract, is remitted to the laws of the country with whose government or
citizens the contract is entered into for redress."4
The representatives of the United States at the third Pan-American
conference, which met at Rio de Janeiro during the months of July
and August, 1906, were given the following instructions:
It has long been the established policy of the United States not to use its
armed forces for the collection of ordinary contract debts due to its citi-
zens by other governments. We have not considered the use of force
for such a purpose consistent with that respect for the independent
sovereignty of other members of the family of nations, which is the
most important principle of international law and chief protection of
weak nations against the oppression of the strong. It seems to us that
the practice is injurious in its general effect upon the relations of nations
and upon the welfare of weak and disordered states, whose development
ought not be encouraged in the interests of civilization; that it offers
frequent temptation to bullying and oppression and to unnecessary and
unjustifiable warfare. We regret that other powers, whose opinions and
31 For the opinions of American statesmen on this head, see Moore's and Wharton's
Digest, §§916, 918, 995-998; and §§231-232, respectively.
"Moore's Digest, vi, §995, p. 710. cf. Wharton, ii, §231, p. 656.
41 Wharton's Digest, ii, pp. 658-659. But exceptions have been made in cases
where diplomacy furnished the only means of redress, as in case of non-performance
of a government contract, or arbitrary confiscation of vested rights, or of annulment
of charters or concessions. For examples, see Moore's Digest, vi, §§918, 996 and
997 and Wharton, ii, §232. "International commissions have frequently allowed
claims based on the infraction of rights derived from contracts where the denial of
justice was properly established," Moore, p. 718.
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sense of justice we esteem highly, have at times taken a different view
and have permitted themselves, though we believe with reluctance, to
collect such debts by force. It is doubtless true that the non-payment of
public, debts may be accompanied by such circumstances of fraud and
wrongdoing or violation of treaties as to justify the use of force. This
government would be glad to see an international consideration of the
subject which shall discriminate between such cases and the simple non-
performance of a contract with a private person, and a resolution in favor
of reliance upon peaceful means in cases of the latter class.
It is not felt, however, that the conference at Rio should undertake to
make such a discrimination or to resolve upon such a rule. Most of the
American countries are still debtor nations, while the countries of Europe
are the creditors. If the Rio conference, therefore, were to take such
action it would have the appearance of a meeting of debtors resolv-
ing how their creditors should act, and this would not inspirerespect.
The true course is indicated by the terms of the program, which propose
to request the second Hague conference, where both creditor and debtors
will be assembled, to consider the subject."
It will thus be seen that whereas Great Britain has, generally speak-
ing, refrained from diplomatic intervention in such cases purely from
motives of policy or expediency, the United States appears to have
been restrained, to a certain extent at least, by principle and by a
regard for what it believed to be the law of nations.
When we turn to international practice, which is, generally speaking,
the basis of international law, we find, it is true, a considerable number
of instances not merely of pacific or diplomatic interposition, but of
actual armed intervention on financial grounds, as e: g., in Mexico
Egypt, Portugal, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and in Turkey. But a closer
scrutiny and reflection will not fail to convince us that these cases are
altogether exceptional and only serve to prove that the ordinary every-
day rule is that of non-intervention.
It is obvious that the question of the forcible collection of all claims
of a pecuniary nature (we are not speaking of diplomatic intervention
or interposition) must be decided in accordance with the principles
governing the intervention of one state in the internal affairs of
another.
The subject of intervention is one of great difficulty and complexity.
This arises from the fact that there exists nowhere else within the wide
range of international relations such an apparent conflict between politi-
4From President Roosevelt's recent message to Congress of December 4, 1906.
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cal theory or fundamental principles on the one hand and actual inter-
national practice on the other. The whole modern or Grotian system
of international law rests upon the doctrine of the absolute legal equal-
ity and complete independence of fully sovereign states. This presup-
poses full liberty of action on the part of each sovereign within his
own sphere or jurisdiction and non-interference in the external or inter-
nal affairs of other sovereigns. The rule or doctrine of non-interven-
tion is therefore a necessary corollary of the doctrine or principle of the
complete equality and independence of sovereign states and is a funda-
mental principle of international law.
But international law is supposed to rest upon international prac-
tice as well as upon fundamental principles, and when we turn to
examine the actual practice of sovereign states, and especially that of
the great powers during the nineteenth century, we find numerous
examples of armed intervention on all sorts of grounds and pretexts.
Intervention on grounds of morality or humanity, e. g., to put an end
to great crimes and slaughter or to various forms of cruelty and oppres-
sion (as in the case of religious persecution), to prevent the extermi-
nation of a race or a needless diffusion of blood, to assure the triumph
of right and justice, etc.; intervention on grounds of policy or interest,
e. g., to secure the balance of power or maintenance of political equilib-
rium in Europe, to enforce protection of the persons and property of
citizens or subjects of the intervening state, to prevent the spread of
political heresy or revolution, to advance the interests of civilization,
etc.; interventions on so-called legal grounds, for the sake of self-preser-
vation, to prevent or terminate the unjustifiable or illegal interven-
tion of another state, to enforce treaties of guarantee or fundamental
principles of international law: these are some of the grounds or pre-
texts which have been advocated as sufficient causes for armed inter-
vention in particular cases.
Authorities on international law have always differed widely in their
opinions as to what constitute legal or justifiable grounds for inter-
vention or whether, indeed, there exists any such right at all. The
only approach to unanimity is in respect to the right of self-preserva-
tion which is, properly speaking, not a law at all in the ordinary sense
of that term as applied to positive rules and regulations, but is a funda-
mental right or principle which underlies and takes precedence of all
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systems of positive law and custom, and from whose operation neither
nations nor individuals could escape if they would.
The present tendency among publicists is certainly toward the accept-
ance of the principle of non-intervention as the correct and normal
or every-day rule of international law and practice;4 but to admit
intervention as a legitimate exercise of sovereign power in extreme or
exceptional cases on high moral or political rather than on purely legal
grounds, as for instance in case of great crimes against humanity
(Greece, Armenia, and Cuba) or where essential and permanent national
or international interests of far-reaching importance are at stake
(Ottoman Empire, Mexico, or Panama).
Like war,44 intervention is not, strictly speaking, a right in the ordi-
nary legal sense of that term, although, like war, it is a source of legal
rights and duties. Like war it is an exercise of sovereign or high politi-
cal power, a right inherent in sovereignty itself. "The government
which intervenes performs a political act.14 5  "It is a high and sum-
mary procedure which may sometimes snatch a remedy beyond the
reach of law; ' '41 but which is either "above and beyond the domain of
law; '47 and a justifiable exception to the ordinary, everyday rule of
non-intervention, or an act based upon the mere consciousness of
physical force. Inasmuch as a sovereign who chooses to exercise this
43 Among modern authorities on international law, who either deny the right of
intervention or accept the principle of non-intervention with or without exceptions,
the following may be cited: Bonfils (Fauchille) §§295-324: Heffter (Geffeken),
§§44-46; Woolsey, §43; Wilson and Tucker, §41: Walker, Science, pp. 112, 151; De
Floecker, De l'Intervention (1896), ch. 2, §3; F. de Martens, Trait6. i, §76, pp. 394 ff.;
Liszt, §7, pp. 60 ff., Despagnet, Cours, pp. 188 if.; Funck-Brentano et Sorel, Precis,
pp. 212-216; P. Foddr6, Trait6, §355; Rivier, Principes, i, pp. 390 if.; Nys, Le Droit
Int. (1905), ii, pp. 182-193, especially p. 191; Merignac, Trait6 (1905), i, pp. 284 ff.
Calvo is not among the champions of non-intervention. Several of the authorities
above cited like P. Fod~r6 and Funek-Brentano et Sorel deny the legal character or
validity of the principle of non-intervention as well as that of intervention. The
view of the majority seems to be that the correct rule of international law is non-
intervention, but that intervention is either legally or morally permissible in extreme
and exceptional cases.
4 It differs from war in that a mere threat to use force is sufficient to constitute
an intervention. In case of resistance, it almost inevitably leads to war.
41 Funck-Brentano et Sorel, Precis, pp. 212-216. For a brief exposition of this
view, which is believed to be that of the most advanced publicists in Europe, see an
article by Professor Georg Jellinek in 35 Am. Law Review, pp. 56-62.
4 4 Letters of Historicus by Sir W. Harcourt, p. 41.
'7 Lawrance, Principles, pp. 121.
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supreme assertion of political power cannot as a rule be restrained
except by the counter use of force, it may become necessary for another
or other interested sovereigns to exercise a similar political power and
intervene against such unjust or injurious act of intervention.
We trust it is now sufficiently clear to all as to what our attitude
as a nation is or should be toward the Calvo and Drago Doctrines.
Both the wider Calvo and the narrower Drago Doctrines are essentially
sound in principle and expedient as policy, although Calvo goes too
far in condemning diplomatic interposition or the presentation of
claims for indemnity in all cases under consideration, and he does not
sufficiently allow for exceptions to general rules or principles which
are otherwise sound and correctly stated by him. The range and char-
acter of these exceptions have been indicated in the first part of this
article.
While we do not deny the responsibility of governments to foreigners
and their liability in certain cases, even during times of civil war and
insurrection, it is certain that the major part of such demands are
usually far in excess of liability and are based on erroneous principles.
The following examples, selected for the most part from Moore's Work
on Arbitration, may serve to illustrate the exorbitant amounts of most
of these claims.4
The Civil War claims of Great Britain against the United States,
which were settled by a mixed commission in 1873, amounted (with
interest) to about $96,000,000. Less than $2,000,000 was actually
awarded to the British claimants. Of the 478 British claims, 259 were
for property alleged to have been taken by the military, naval or civil
authorities of the United States; 181 for property alleged to have been
destroyed by the military and naval forces of the United States; 7 for
property destroyed by the Confederacy; 100 for damages for the
alleged unlawful arrest and imprisonment of British subjects by the
authorities of the United States; 77 for damages for the alleged unlawful
capture and condemnation or detention of British vessels and their
cargoes as prize of war by the naval forces and civil authorities of the
United States."9
In a recent pamphlet, entitled Par la Justice vers la Paix, Professor F. de Martens
calls special attention to the excessive and fraudulent character of many of these
claims.
4' See Moore on Arbitration, i, pp. 692-693.
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The claims of France growing out of the Civil War were also settled
by a mixed commissionwhich met in 1880-84. They aggregated about
$35,000,000. The amount actually awarded was $625,566.35, i. e., less
than 2 per cent of the amount demanded. Many of the claims are
said to have been fraudulent and others were greatly exaggerated.
Most of the awards were for injuries inflicted by the armies of the
United States, i. e., presumably for violations of the laws of warfare. 0
The claims of the citizens of the United States against Mexico, pre-
sented to the mixed commission which met in July, 1869, and continued
in session until January, 1876, amounted to the enormous sum of
$470,000,000. The actual amount awarded was $4,000,000 or less
than one per cent. The claims of citizens of Mexico against the United
States amounted to $86,000,000. They received $150,000.51
The mixed commissions which adjudicated the claims against Vene-
zuela at Caracas during the summer of 1903, awarded 2,313,711 boli-
vars to claimants of the United States out of 81,410,952 which were
demanded; 1,974,818 to Spanish claimants who had demanded 5,307,-
626; 2,975,906 to Italian claimants who had asked for 39,844,258;
2,091,908 to German claimants who had demanded 7,376,685; 9,401,267
to British claimants instead of 14,743,572 as demanded; and 10,898,643
to Belgian claimants who had only demanded 14,921,805 bolivars5 2
The demands of French claimants, which amounted to nearly $8,000,-
000 were cut down to $685,000.53
Besides being excessive in amount, it is believed that many of these
claims are bottomed on fraud and tainted with illegality and injustice.
It is notorious that the sums received by a government are often far
below the face value of the loan and many of the claimants for losses
during civil war or insurrection are not above a well-grounded sus-
picion of having themselves been engaged in unneutral or insurrec-
tionary acts.
In view of the ill-founded character of many, if not most, of such
claims and of the danger to the peace and safety of the states of Latin
America resulting from their forcible collection by leading European
10 Moore, ii, pp. 1133 f., 1156 ff.
11 Moore, ii, pp. 1319 f.
12 These figures are taken from Latan6's excellent article on "The Forcible Collec-
tion of International Debts" in the Atlantic Monthly for October, 1906, p. 546.
5
s This is based on a statement in the Outlook (1906), vol. 82, p. 104.
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powers, the United States would be fully justified even in advancing
a step beyond the Drago Doctrine and declaring formally to the world
that it could not see with indifference any attempt at the forcible
collection of private claims of a pecuniary nature on the Western Con-
tinent.5  The Monroe Doctrine, at least in its present form, forbids
the further acquisition, colonization, or permanent occupation of Amer-
ican territory by any European power, and it is believed that such a
declaration would not only be in harmony with the spirit of that doc-
trine but that it would lend strength to the principle of non-inter-
vention.
In view, however, of the fact that some of these claims may be well-
founded and that the judicial tribunals in certain portions of Central
America are notoriously inadequate for the impartial and effective
administration of justice, and because of the frequency of revolutions
due mainly to fraudulent elections, it might be well to couple this
declaration with another, insisting that all such claims be submitted
to fair and impartial arbitral tribunals or mixed commissions composed
of representatives from both the creditor and debtor nations.55
The United States has no desire to become a "debt collecting agency"
for European creditors or to establish a protectorate over the states of
Latin America. For these reasons our government should avoid, if
possible, the responsibility of an ex parte decision regarding the validity
of these claims, although the assumption of such a burden would be
preferable to their forcible collection by European powers. Our insist-
ence upon arbitration in the case of the famous boundary dispute
between Great Britain and Venezuela in 1895, points the way toward
what is at once the easiest and most equitable settlement of such
disputes.
AMOS S. HERSHEY.
14The wisdom of such a course is greatly strengthened by the decision of the
Hague tribunal rendered on February 22, 1904, which granted the contention of the
allies that they were entitled to preferential treatment in consequence of their
coercion of Venezuela. For a recent thoroughgoing criticism of this decision, see a
long article by Ml. Mallarm4 in the Revue G~n~rale D. I. P. for 1906, pp. 423-500.
11 Professor F. de Martens suggests the Hague tribunal as a suitable court for the
arbitration of these claims, but in view of its decision in the Venezuela case, it would
perhaps be better to retain the present system of mixed commissions.
